

C-II

It was luck
that

a) - ✓ EK "won"

K. beached down

b) the ~~Baron~~ ^{Baron}

was not experienced

(a lot more like
the others - fig.

bars

with VER not K
believed there could
be even

"Because A won't
let that happen"

(it takes 2;
each has a veto
on war;

He will ^{possibly} beat down;
or if not - if he doesn't,
A will.

[BUT: will events - and

by supporters, rivals,
and by our impulses
in the event

allow her to " "

[Will A (VGR) —
be able/willing to
interview for VOA
in 1965? (forced
into defunct)]

Good over-estimate

of his own control
over (his country's)
action

his allies' actions

and opponents' control
over his and
his allies' actions!

[R/NVN; NVN/TS
control ~~concerns~~,
Philippines, ...

(last/ Nagasaki cathedral)

OK: inevitable
(in '64) ORV delegated
to control command.
or similar...

TCs... that it would
deploy wavefronts, or
delegates...

It connects control
center [or be an
SAO...]

(VCS/WAT - search +
data...)

Days of Ishmael
- control

PROBS
+ C-II

1)

What did JFK
expect?

asked on his
own decisions
on K decisions

2) What did other
expect (7 knew)?

see differences
+ own two

BR

3) How realistic
were the
estimates?

4) What did the
series reveal
about the
values? Proving
convictions?

5) What can we learn
about others?
(measures, TW)

values ?

estimates ?

Real Risk ?

Errors ?

Behavior in crises



What risk was JFK
willing to take ?

(small - as he
estimated (it was
much higher - he
underestimated
overall risk, in

being willing to
take some risk

willingness to lose -
+ win

Over-est of

1) his own resources

2) his ability to

control his subordinates

or allies

or data otherwise

(control then, if
threats, warnings)

(see CBJ/MCN in 1965)

Charging of
bombs

SC - to use
two ones

JCS - to attack
(and missiles...)

- to launch SIOP
if ...

= "K won't ...

- JFK can wait until
better, ...! (Possible?)

SU
- Failure to
control areas
("Cuba")

Was President
ready to authorize
two areas of interest?

(Carter: prompt
next morning)

(later / before
using two areas
if he had IRBMs!
(if he could have

but, with MRBMs?)

VFR unit
try to VCS:

We commit.

(coming out throats;
props don't seem
K...

VFR bluff -
moment - because
it won't ~~so~~ work
of a bluff as he
thought: Carter could
have enforced it -

C-II

10-14-11

History:

On Oct 15,
Road + Ridge Road
Turkey in mind -

"We'll have to
eat it."

VFK didn't - it
must go."

(VFK not clear
about Turkey - "5 years
ago." Although he
would eat it. ^{Admission} RFR

(RFE + Vienna)

(Qui Abom
Plinken)

not "glass
door" (Genthoff)

The area in
Cuba were not
for detention —
they were for
definitely
low troops (Genthoff)
Gibbs

(Parker: over all
bluff) (since '62?)
N? re: top

10-15-11

C-II

At 5AM had shot
down U-2 on
Oct 14

(as NRO
found - from
JAOs!)

Kwinn!

If K had ~~reported~~
stayed with
Oct 27 way -
(as JFK/RFC
expected)

- JFK had a time
limit, just like
K - ~~Chad~~

(Custom AA continues
to fire - even if it
doesn't hit
JCS down by attack.)

the prospects
of K even
going in?
to POC, etc.

Those who
thought be would
tighten blockade
didn't know
of Russ plans

Prospectus

Notes

TR: - got York,
Linnou

- Houtbiff
Brewings,
on 1961

Houtbiff (Oct, in Oct
379

K didn't know
what balance
to center

$\$10^2$ ICBOs

(US? = Oct 62

10-4-11

[In '69, with
RFR "13 Days"
(and his "2nd warning")
did outreach
known that Embury
AA was not
controlled of K?
When was that
known?)

in the meat
every and Shoup (!)
& Payson.

(Nitzo, Dallas, Taylor,
McCom, (Mc6? other 2?)

PRK. "If 6 had been finished -
was."

Went to business?

Significant - but not so
surely known?

LESSON: Manuals, designs of
are was (and is, long, was)
was greater than "they" know!
(Saying "invention" - LIKE US!

(Bent, Wint, McA,
conducting various Reu
Reu, long VN
would beat!

See Castro, will to
beat (vs. Wander, ...)

out (will - / or Castro)
(No!)

nothing to "accept"
anything (+ refuting) cas.
is are even!

(Not JFK, K, McGB..

(Always use G-Y
as "one more crisis"
threatening
"destruction" of Cuba!
"Oct. Crisis.")

(Soviet + Russian Days)

C-B

- If H had convinced
(see memo on this)

- If K had revised
(He and a local ...
~~at~~ detention!)

- [If he had been open?
If H had not lied!

- [Could VOR have
improved for them?]

→ If no shooting on Oct 27?

(4) K could have

guaranteed JFK &

brill - no shooting

on Oct 28 - and

normal Turkey

privately

(to USCIB??!)

said that was at

5 PM Moscow,

(9 AM DC -

all time

K sees VFK walking
toward an
unmanned
min-fil
tipping D.M.
(use war)

Neen → AA →
attack on SAMs/MRBMs
(ends fairly well)
→ invasion → two
waves → US waves on
SU troops in Cuba and
on SU → Europe, use
water

(couldn't the
low altitude or
Europe come
are within in
1962??

10, 2 D.V. is
already,

before 1966-68-
70

change of are within
just up after NPT:

MIRV

[testing NOW → MIRV → ^{DHs}

100 men in China
in 1962!

(Costs - around
more?)

Every around is

irreversible, irreversible

(except China?)

C-I

SDM - not
only not under
IC control

not under Physic
control - final
opinion order
(intent Physic
(Nagasaki - nuclear
control? did they
half see a break
in elements?)

C-II

They acted as
if certain goals/

A rather than B

"Not working down"

Talk to

11-3-11

Jim Douglas
Pollock

Karim - VN ROBEL

Dobbs - C-II?

Hendley (Berster)

Sergei K. Kuroshin

Mikoyan

Viktor

Arbatov, etc.

Sum. Sec.

PUTIN!

POS - are dangerous

Critiques of Douglas
Pollock

Alperin

(Kruglik / Stone :

✓ SCHERER / Hawk / Mayor

POS Regg?
10-28-11

Hawkes in SU and
US collaborated (?)
on getting SU
moving into Cuba
to discredit &
move back
K and JFK

(x rail: 0)

JFK — been here. after.

not an attack

NO invasion

but: blockade

readiness

to get moving

Trade :

Cast, Havana

Italy?

Berlin

Britain

all US out of
Turkey; please

Blight vs. Hensley -
"On Oct 16, they
don't talk about
vivarian moderns."

- No - they don't talk
about Mr. Maynard,
either! "

+ see his about
plans - re Maynard
→ vivarian. (prowe-
ction; Northwoods
("no intent to invade")

Hyp: JAKs from
drawing of minutes
- mission is cut
(purport on
attack? But if it
doesn't put all...

(actually, on an attack
before Oct 23 would have
But - proof there
were minutes?!

included workbooks -
no way to know that...

"Was IC willing
to take a high
risk?"

(BB - so what?)

Actually, not
but he said
risk as low!

It wasn't "center";
but it was high!

(after several messages?)
SAM thats more but
the risk as high!

2-II

Not knowing of
Morgue or incision,
I misunderstood
what led to C-II
("VFK weakness"
- "demios")

(Note: K didn't
think VFK was as
weak as we'd but,
K said our notes
openly!) (& next's been)
and down, fear of
weakness in VN - demios...

Nov 11

50 after 5-II

Savo didn't read —
and couldn't see —
a credible FS force
(as US had until
1963-64)

By ^{said} could see —
but not read —
a "not-credible,
delusional FS force"
like US after 1965

They went and to
thinks FC was
a US ally —

(~~the~~ excuse for
Cuba — they said
that, but kept it
secret, as thinks!)

Now, went and
to thinks "raising the
bid" on ES.

Walt by himself
- at drink bar in
61-162

was a credible
Walt / several - sticks
from

he advised that
Rings:

(B's) were widely
credible & dangerous

1
2
3

(low mil.

Cost of B-B?)

SO DM.

Crisis

Nov 2

11

DS scandal out:
Will this make him
feel ^{ex}humiliated -
or attacked, very
angry?

Will it expose him
to danger of losing
office, power?

embarrass him further?
his friends, his dems, advisers
Ihn - expect the

uncharacteristically
bald, violent,
(illegal...)

action

to avert loss
or to revenge
(war-like)...

(pay/risk in order
to harm or humiliate)

No. 2

"More New Eastern"

Shubley

✓ Amity of a Crisis

✓ - Men on Baby & the C-4

Mark Brown

✓ The 'Lessons' of C-4
for Warsaw Pact Area

Ops

- Fore River Wpus,

Sanit Command Center

+ C-4

Er